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In numerous cases, including Roe v. Wade, Chief Justice Warren Burger is
reputed to have held back from voicing his opinion in conference until the position of the
majority was clear, so that he could ensure he was in the majority and thus able to assign
the writing of the opinion. In the case of Roe, Burger is even said to have assigned the
opinion when he was clearly in the minority, much to the protestation of Justice Douglas,
the senior majority justice (Epstein and Knight, 1998). Furthermore, Burger was able to
convince the Court to have the case re-heard when two new justices could join the
decision-making process. However, the strategy backfired, as the eventual opinion was
considerably more distant from Burger’s own preferences than the opinion initially
circulated after the first hearing had been (ibid.).
What these episodes illustrate, other than the apparent cunning of Burger, is that
case outcomes are the product of shifting judicial coalitions. But equally, and
simultaneously, judicial coalitions can be expected to shift, subject to the position of the
proposed case outcome. Additionally, these episodes suggest that the role of judicial
norms, including but not limited to those relating to opinion assignment, can be
influential on judicial outcomes, although these norms are apparently not always
followed.
Even without the complication of re-hearings, freshly confirmed justices, and
breach of judicial etiquette, majority coalition formation and case outcome determination
are complex processes. In particular, this Article explores two of these complexities.
The first is the simultaneity in effect of coalition formation and outcome determination
upon each other. The second is the inherent trade-off between the ideological positioning
of case outcomes and the breadth of coalition formation.
Due to the first complexity, any equilibrium will be an outcome-coalition diad.
Due to the second complexity, what those equilibria will be will depend on the decisionmaking rule that balances that trade-off. Which decision-making rule is operative will
depend in turn upon judicial norms, or their absence.

I formally explore possible modes of judicial decision-making, varying the
inherent trade-off between ideological positioning of case outcomes and coalition
formation. From this, I produce three models of judicial ideology and coalition
formation, which predict the ideological position of case outcomes and the size of the
majority coalition in each case. The models are essentially: first, a minimum winning
coalition model, which represents an attitudinalist notion of judicial decision-making;
second, a maximum winning coalition, which captures theorized norms of joint opinion
writing and collegiality; and third, a constrained ideological model that incorporates the
concept of the credibility of threats to defect from a majority outcome when the outcome
of cases is too distant from the marginal justice’s preferences, constituting a strategic
model of judicial decision-making.
Each of these models is capable of producing comprehensive predictions over a
continuum of status quos, and can be operationalized as measures. The first measure
captures the dominance of the median in median voter theories; its results hinge on the
median justice. The second measure approximates a maximum winning coalition; its
results hinge on the ideological position of the marginal justice in the coalition. The third
measure approximates the mean of the ideal points of the majority coalition; its results
hinge largely on the indifference point of the marginal justice in the coalition. Using an
estimate of ideological preferences of justices that is constant over time, such as Martin
and Quinn’s (2002) measure of the dynamic ideal point of Supreme Court justices, these
models can make comprehensive predictions about case outcomes under given court
compositions. Additionally, they can be applied to empirical analyses of judicial
ideology (see Baird and Jacobi, 2006).
A final point that is apparent from the initial illustration is that coalition formation
and case outcome determination, in the form of opinion writing, is as much art as it is
science. It is a product of charm, persuasion and other intangibles not captured in any of
these models. As such, none of them will perfectly capture the many nuances of the
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politics and personality that determine the exact placement of cases. Nevertheless, the
measures developed use more information – in that they consider coalition size and
composition – and so are more nuanced and likely to capture reality than the standard
measure of judicial ideology – which looks only to whether a case is labeled “liberal” or
“conservative” (see Jacobi and Baird, 2006).

I. Three Models of Judicial Decision-Making, Ideology and Coalition Formation
This section develops three formal models, which yield predictions over the
placement and composition of majorities in the current Supreme Court. It assumes the
justices have full information: they know their own position, the positions of their
colleagues, and the underlying status quo. The status quo is the outcome prior to Supreme
Court action (similar analysis for courts of first instance would be the facts as presented
to the court). Each of the models considers judicial ideology in one dimension; this is not
to deny that other dimensions may well be salient to traditional decision-makers, but this
allows us to examine the relationship between ideological preference maximization and
coalition formation most clearly. To the extent that other dimensions exist and are not
independent of the ideology dimension, the findings will be affected.
The underlying ideological position of the status quo, SQx, is key to determining
the outcome of the case, because it constitutes the alternative to any proposed majority
decision, Mx. A vote to affirm is a vote to maintain SQx. An undecided justice has to
choose between supporting the majority ruling at Mx or dissenting in favor of maintaining
the status quo SQx. This is a necessary initial simplification: although they are deciding
whether to uphold a ruling or provide an alternative, justices can effectively write a
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dissent or concurrence at any ideological point.1 I later discuss the impact of
concurrences.
Additionally, the proposed majority position will itself be determined by the
position of the status quo: whether five justices are willing to sign on to a majority
opinion will depend on the ideological distance between the justice and the status quo
versus the justice and the proposed majority ruling.
i = {J1, J2, …J9}
s = (Mx, SQx) for all s S
I assume that, when indifferent, a justice will join a majority. Thus Ji will join the
majority if Ji prefers the majority outcome to the status quo.
s* = Mx iff Ji – SQx > Ji – Mx
Mx = f(SQx, J1, J2, …J9) such that Ji – SQx > Ji – Mx for at least J1:J5 or J5:J9.
The position of Mx will also depend upon the relative value justices place on
ideology compared to collegial support. Justices forming a majority will face a trade-off
between the extent the opinion reflects their ideology and picking up additional votes
from their colleagues, whose ideological positions do not mirror their own. I consider
three decision rules that capture three contrasting approaches to this inherent trade-off.
First, I model the justices as pure “ideologues:” those who prefer that a majority
outcome approximating their ideological position in favor of picking up a sixth vote. This
decision-making rule is equivalent to a strategy of seeking a minimum winning coalition.

1

In reality, the choice of Mx may be affected by whether the decision reverses or affirms: this will act as a

constraint on the balance of Mx. Here, I ignore this potential constraint; the results can be read as subject to
the window allow by this limit. Similarly, other constraints may be operative, such as legal constraints, or
the anticipated response of the elected branches, the public etc.
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This first model captures the attitudinalist view of justices, which holds that justices
decide cases predominantly by reference to there own political preferences (Segal and
Spaeth, 1993).
Second, I model the justices as “collegiates:” those who will sacrifice ideological
proximity in order to maximize the size of a majority, short of switching sides. This
decision-making rule is reminiscent of a maximum winning coalition, with the outcome
dependant on the “last justice in” to the coalition. This model captures the view that
judicial decision-making is structured by internal judicial norms, particularly of
collegiality (Edwards, 1998).
The third model requires some preliminary explanation. Under many decisionmaking regimes, a range of possible majorities will often be feasible; the more of an
outlier SQx is in relation to the spectrum of judicial ideal points, the more viable majority
alternatives will exist. As we have already seen, the equilibrium Mx will depend on rules
of judicial decision-making, which represent a preference for ideology versus collegiality.
But it is possible that a decision-making rule can be less absolute than the two considered
above; I consider here two further possibilities.
When the marginal justice is indifferent, i.e. when s* is an equality, the marginal
justice can credibly threaten to switch sides. If that marginal justice is the median, that
threat involves forming a majority with the dissenting justices. The impact of this threat
will shape the placement of Mx.
Whether this threat is really credible, however, depends on the willingness of the
dissenting justices to play ball. Consider a simplified example where justices are
uniformly distributed ideologues, and SQx = J1: seven justice, J3:J9, prefer Mx = J3, and
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justice J2 is indifferent. But six justices, J4:J9, also prefer any Mx = J4:J7 to SQx. But
justices J1:J5 all prefer Mx = J5 to Mx` = J7; thus J4 and J5 can threaten to switch sides
unless Mx = J5. But credibility of this threat depends on J1’s willingness to vote for Mx =
J5 over SQ = J1.
The logic is clear, but what is not clear is whether justices are willing to strategize
to this extent. We know that courts have norms of behavior, stemming from the ongoing
relationship between the justices, as well as notions of appropriate judicial conduct and
ethics (Howard, 1981).
Rather than make assumptions about the nature of judicial conduct, I again
consider different decision-making rules. The first is unconstrained best responses, under
which the equilibrium strategy will be:
s^ = Mx` iff Ji – Mx > Ji – Mx`
This decision rule will result in identical equilibrium outcomes, regardless of whether
justices are ideologues or collegiates.
The second decision rule is normatively constrained best responses. It dictates that
Ji will not agree to an alternative majority, Mx`, if the distance between Ji’s preferences
and the status quo is less than the difference between the two proposed rulings:
s^ = Mx` iff Ji – SQx > Mx – Mx`
This second decision rule will result in different outcomes for ideologues and
collegiates. Thus I present three sets of equilibrium outcomes resulting from the three
different decision-making rules: unconstrained best responses of both ideologues and
collegiates (UIC), normatively constrained best responses of ideologues (NCI), and
normatively constrained best responses of collegiates (NCC).
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To illustrate, I first generate full results for the reductionist model, with a
spectrum of uniformly distributed justices, and outcomes occuring at the position of the
closest justice’s ideology. I then create a generalized model with a continuum of status
quos, where outcomes can occur at any point on the ideological plane. Finally, I present
the results for the Rehnquist Court, under Martin and Quinn’s ideological measures (there
is not yet data on the Roberts Court).
Consider first a status quo at the exact position of the median justice, J5. This will
result in a 9:0 judgment at Mx = J5. All the justices are indifferent between SQx and Mx.
J1:J4 prefer J4 to any Mx in this range, but if they dissent at SQx < Mx, a five justice
majority will exist for Mx` equidistant from SQx to the right of J5. Thus J5 will be the 9:0
equilibrium outcome under each of the decision-making regimes.
But this result is fairly trivial: it occurs only at the exact cutpoint SQx = J5, and
arises out of the assumption that indifferent justices will join the majority opinion. The
results are more interesting when we consider a continuum of status quos. If SQx = J5 +/Q, the result will be a 5:4 judgment at Mx = J5. If liberal movements are negative and
conservative movements are positive, and thus the most liberal justice is J1 and the most
conservative justice is J9, then for SQx = J5 +Q, the result will be a coalition J1:J5 with
outcome Mx = J5. For SQx = J5 -Q, the result will be a coalition J5:J9 with outcome Mx =
J5. These results apply for any (J5 – J4)/2 < SQx < (J6 – J5)/2.
A second example illustrates the difference between the various decision-making
regimes. For simplicity, I now consider only alternatives at exactly the nine justices’ ideal
points, and again use the uniform distribution of justices, but this is relaxed again shortly.
Consider a status quo at J2. Seven justices, J3:J9, prefer Mx = J3 or J4; but a
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majority of that coalition, J5:J9, prefer any Mx` = J5:J8 to Mx = J4. Under the normatively
constrained collegiate rule, because any movement further right than J4 will result in a
loss of a majority vote, the equilibrium outcome will be 7:2 majority at J4.
Under the unconstrained rule, the equilibrium outcome will be a 6:3 majority at
J5, because J5 can credibly threaten to switch sides if Mx R J5. But under the normatively
constrained ideological rule, J1 and J2 will not agree to support J5’s threat to defect, as for
Mx = J6 or J7, the distance they would gain in moving the equilibrium closer to their
preferences is less than the distance they lose, being on record supporting a position far
from their preferences. A majority J2:J6 would prefer J5 to J8, but the threat necessary to
achieve Mx = J5 is not credible, so Mx` = J6. As such, the equilibrium is a 6:3 majority at
J6 .
Table 1 provides a summary of the results when justices are uniformly distributed,
for status quos at the ideal points of each of the justices; Figure 1 provides a summary of
those results for a continuum of status quos. Table 1 shows the results for liberal status
quos; conservative status quos are the mirror image. Otherwise, Table 1 and Figure 1
each consider status quos including the entire ideological spectrum of the court, but also
extending beyond the most extreme liberal and conservative justices on the spectrum, to
the point that is the ideological mirror of the median, to the left (right) of the most liberal
(conservative) justice.
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Table 1: Predictions of the 3 Models when Justices Uniformly Distributed
Status Quo

J5
J4
J3
J2
J1
J1(J2)
J1(J3)
J1(J4)
J1(J5)

Unconstrained
Normatively
Ideologues and
Constrained Ideologues
Collegiates
Size of
Outcome Size of
Outcome
Majority
Majority
9:0*
J5
9:0 *
J5
5:4
J5
5:4
J6
6:3
J5
5:4
J7
6:3
J5
6:3
J6
7:2
J5
6:3
J6
7:2
J5
7:2
J6
8:1
J5
8:1
J6
8:1
J5
8:1
J5
9:0
J5
9:0
J5
* 9:0 at J5 exactly, 5:4 at (J5 – J4)/2 < J5 < (J6 – J5)/2.

Normatively
Constrained
Collegiates
Size of
Outcome
Majority
9:0*
J5
6:3
J4
7:2
J3
8:1
J2
9:0
J1
9:0
J2
9:0
J3
9:0
J4
9:0
J5

Figure 1: Equilibrium Outcomes for UIC, NCI and NCC Models
Equilibrium
Outcomes
J9

UIC
NCI

J8

NCC

J7
J6
J5
J4
J3
J2
J1
J1(J5) J1(J4) J1(J3) J1(J2)

J1

J2

J3

J4

J5

J6

J7

J8

J9 J9(J8) J9(J7) J9(J6) J9(J5)

SQ

Some interesting results arise from Table 1 and Figure 1. First, while the size of
the majority varies under the unconstrained model, the ideological placement of the
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court’s ruling is consistently at the median. This suggests that the heterogeneity we see in
the ideological positions of Supreme Court rulings (see e.g. Cross 2006) must stem in
part from the unwillingness of justices to sign on to any outcome that is closer to their
preferences, in favor of maintaining their dissenting positions. Consequently, there is
reason to doubt whether the first model will provide a very accurate measure of judicial
ideology.
Second, unsurprisingly the collegiate rule considerably expands the size of
majorities. In fact, under the collegiate rule, we only see split opinions when the status
quo lies within the spectrum of judicial ideology, excluding status quos at the exact
median (which as discussed is a trivial result arising from the assumption relating to
indifference and occurs only at one exact status quo). Any status quo that is more liberal
than the most liberal justice, or more conservative than the most conservative justice,
results in a unanimous opinion.
But the more striking fact about the collegiate model is that its results are
discontinuous. The coalition size continually expands as status quos become more
extreme, and consequently the equilibrium outcome tends toward the ideological
preferences of the extreme justices. But in every interval between the cutpoint of the
inclusion of a new justice and the next such cutpoint, the equilibrium outcome is
leveraged back toward the moderate justices. Intuitively, this result seems implausible.
Third, the constrained ideological and collegiate models show two similar
patterns: in predicting the approximate size of the majority coalitions, and in predicting
the greater influence of the median justices for moderate and extreme status quos, with
the greatest influence of the outliers when status quos are extreme but within the
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spectrum of judicial ideology on the court.
But the difference between these two models predictions is key: they have reverse
predictions of the directions of the trends in the equilibrium outcomes for all other status
quos. The collegiate model predicts that liberal status quos will result in liberal outcomes,
whereas the constrained ideological model predicts that liberal status quos will result in
conservative outcomes. This is because liberal status quos give conservative justices the
ability to sway the pivotal median justices to a conservative outcome that is nevertheless
closer to the median justices’ preferences than the liberal status quo. This effect is only
operative on the collegiate model for status quos in the interval between judicial ideal
points, as discussed above.
It seems likely that judicial norms prevent the median justice from always
ensuring that the outcome exactly represents her preferences; however it is overstating
the power of judicial norms to suggest that they will prevent majorities from exploiting
the ideological distance of extreme status quos to write opinions that better reflect the
majority coalition’s preferences. As such, the normatively constrained ideological model
seems to better capture the trade-off between collegiality and ideology than the collegiate
model does.
Finally, under all three models, narrow majorities cluster at the centre; broader
court approval exists for status quos that are more extreme. This makes intuitive sense:
more extreme facts are likely to give rise to greater agreement among the justices. The
only exception is status quos that are exactly equal to the position of the median justice,
in which case all of the justices will be indifferent between the alternatives available to
them, and each model predicts unanimous judgments where status quos approximate the
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median. As discussed, this is a trivial result, as every justice is indifferent between the
status quo and an outcome at the median.
Overall, it seems likely that the normatively constrained ideologue model will
best reflect observed judicial behavior. Unlike the unconstrained model, it predicts
variation in outcomes, rather than total domination by the median. At the opposite
extreme, the constrained collegiate model expects too much influence of the extremist
justices, as it predicts that unanimous decisions will occur everywhere except for status
quo lies within the preferences of the centre five justices. NCC predicts that for any status
quo outside the ideological range of the justices will exactly reflect the most extreme
justice’s preferences. This ignores the leverage the moderate justices have to propose a
more central alternative to the status quo that the extremist Justice will be indifferent to.
The ideological model captures that interaction, without assuming away all normative
judicial constraints. It explains observed variation in judicial behavior, fits with intuitive
expectations of how majorities can leverage their strengths to obtain case outcomes that
better fit their own preferences, and does not result in discontinuous outcome predictions.
However, the greater nuance of the constrained ideological model makes it more difficult
than the other two models to convert into a measure that is useful for empirical models.

I.A The Impact of Concurrences
It is possible to develop a decision-making rule for concurrences, and assess the
impact of concurrences on the above results. The results of the unconstrained model and
collegiate model will not be affected by concurrences. But the normatively constrained
ideological model will be affected. Applying the previous logic, a concurrence rule for
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the NCI model is:
Concur if Ji – Mx < Mx – SQx
That is, for Justice i, if the difference from the proposed outcome is greater than
the movement the new majority offers from the status quo toward Justice i’s preferences,
then the Justice will concur. Justice i will concur at Ji, or if more than one justice
concurs, Justice i will concur at the point that satisfies the normal coalition rule for the
potential concurring coalition.
A concurrence rule also requires a rule of response to the concurrence, to see
whether the majority will change their position under the threat of a justice leaving the
majority to concur. The NCI response rule to a threatened concurrence is:
If Ji – Mx~ > Ji – Mx`, do not switch from Mx` to Mx~
The effect of the possibility of concurrence does not affect the equilibrium
position of the case outcomes under the NCI model, but it does change the size of the
coalition for moderate status quos. The differences are: when the status quo is exactly at
J5, instead of a 9:0 majority at J5, there will be a three justice coalition (justices J4: J6) for
an outcome at J5; justices J1: J3 will concur at J2, and justices J7: J9 will concur at J8. As
the status quo moves towards J4, instead of the outcome tracking SQ(J4) with a 5:4
majority, it will be a 4:4 split, with J9 concurring at J9. Then, as the status quo moves
from J4 to (J5 – J4)/2, the outcome will continue to track SQ(J4), but instead of a 6:3
coalition emerging, it will be a 5:4 majority, again with J9 concurring. When the status
quo passes J4, until it reaches (J4 – J3)/2, J8 will join J9 in concurrence. Beyond that point,
the NCI model incorporating occurrences is identical to the NCI model without
concurrences.
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What this shows is that while the treatment of judicial choice as if it was between
joining a majority or dissenting out the status quo is somewhat artificial, it does not
drastically affect the results. Giving the justices a choice to concur does not change the
outcome, though this extension does explain the observance of split opinions.

II. Creating Measures of Judicial Ideology from the Models
Despite increasing empiricism in the study of judicial politics and behavior (see
Epstein and King, 2002), the primary measure available for this analysis is primitive.
Essentially, the standard measure of judicial ideology – “a latent construct organizing a
person’s personal political attitudes” (Zorn and Caldeira, 2003) – is to count the number
of case outcomes categorized as liberal and contrast them to the number of cases labeled
conservative.2 But case facts and the questions of law they present are not dichotomous,
they represent the breadth of legal inquiry. Additionally, one case labeled ‘liberal’ may
be far more liberal than another case with the same label. Treating these two cases as
identical is unsound in principle and dangerous in practice (see Bailey, 2002).
Dissatisfied with current practices, scholars have come up with various measures of the
ideological placement of Supreme Court cases, using only reversals (McGuire and
Stimson 2004), or using a qualitative analysis of language that tends to show up in liberal
or conservative opinions (McGuire and Vanberg Nd). However, even if we rely on the

2

In contrast to proxies for judicial ideology, such as using the ideological score of the appointing president
or the ideal point of the Senator able to exercise senatorial courtesy – see Giles, Hettinger and Peppers
(2001) – or indirect measures, such as media reporting, with content analysis of newspaper editorials – see
Segal and Cover (1989), and see Zorn and Caldeira (2003) for comments.
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traditional judicial ideology dataset, the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database,3
there is much more information than the traditional measure takes account of. In
particular, as well as knowing the label of liberal or conservative that cases receive, we
also know the size and composition of the majority in every case. As such, alternative
and arguably superior measures of judicial ideology can be developed, by taking into
account the size and composition of the winning coalition, as the three models above do.
Despite the differences of the three models of judicial decision-making developed
above, all three are in some ways superior to the traditional model, since they all take into
account the significance of the differences among different liberal outcomes, and among
conservative outcomes. Unlike the traditional form of measurement, these measures
assume that a case that receives approval from the seven most liberal justices is less
liberal than a case that receives approval from only the five most liberal justices, but is
more liberal than a case that receives unanimous approval. This ensures that a Court that
decides a high percentage of unanimous cases in a liberal direction because of an
extremely conservative status quo is not incorrectly coded as being overwhelmingly
liberal. Assessments of Supreme Court activity should not be a function of the
ideological placements of the questions that are presented to the Court, which can change
systematically over time.
To develop empirically useful measures of judicial ideology from our three
models, we must create operationalizations of them. Finding an exact operationalization
for the unconstrained model, is extremely easy. That model consistently predicts that the

3

(updated annually), (Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research,

1997), published as study #9422.
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outcome will be at the exact location of the court median. The operationalization for the
UIC measure is:
Mx = J5 for all SQx

SQ

1

The normatively constrained collegiate model mimics a “last in” model, when the
status quo lies within the spectrum of the ideological makeup of the court. Then, the
predicted outcome of the case is the ideal point of the most liberal justice to join the
coalition when the coalition is conservative-skewed, and the most conservative justice to
join a coalition when the coalition is liberal-skewed. When status quos lie outside the
ideological spectrum of the court, the opposing outliers gain influence, drawing the
outcome back towards the median.
To operationalize the normatively constrained collegiate model, we define J1(SQx)
as the position to the right of J1 that makes J1 in different between that outcome and the
status quo, and J9(SQx) as the equivalent for J9. The operationalization for the NCC
measure is:
Mx

= Jk, if J1 < SQx < J9
where Jk = Ji s.t. Jk – Mx < JiRk – Mx for all Ji where Ji – SQx > Ji – Mx
= J1(SQx), if SQx < J1
= J9(SQx), when SQx >J9

What this means is that the case outcome will be equal to the ideological position
of the most extreme justice (in the direction of the status quo) in the coalition, when
status quos are within the ideological range of the court; and outcomes will track the
indifference point of the most extreme justice (in the direction of the status quo) when
outcomes are more extreme than the court’s ideological range. What this means is that
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liberal (conservative) justices have the most power when outcomes are moderately liberal
(conservative), but their power decreases the more liberal(conservative)the outcome
becomes, once it is more extreme than the court’s collective preferences.
The normatively constrained ideologue model largely tracks the indifference point
of the median justice to the status quo, but subject to constraints. The leverage that
conservative (liberal) justices have when status quos become more extremely liberal
(conservative) reaches its limits when the median can credibly threaten to switch sides
and form a majority with the liberal (conservative) justices. This creates two bounds on
the power of the majority justices to skew the equilibrium outcome toward their
preferences: when either the status quo or the case outcome exceeds the third most
conservative (liberal) justice (that is, the justice who is the median of a minimum winning
coalition), the equilibrium outcome trends back towards the median.
To operationalize the normatively constrained ideologue model,
If J3 < SQ < J5, Mx = J5(SQ), if J5(SQ) < J7, and J7 otherwise
If SQ < J3,

Mx = J5(SQ) – J3 + SQ, if J7 > J5(SQ) > J6,
= J7 – J3 + SQ if J7 > J5(SQ)
= J6, if SQ > J1(J3),
and J1(J3) – J6 + SQ if J1(J3) > J5, and J5 otherwise.

The reverse holds for conservative status quos:
If J7 > SQ > J5, Mx = J5(SQ), if J5(SQ) > J3, and J3 otherwise
If SQ > J7,

Mx = J5(SQ) + J7 – SQ, if J4 > J5(SQ) > J3,
= J3 + J7 – SQ, if J5(SQ) < J3
= J4, if SQ < J9(J7),

17

and J9(J7) + J4 – SQ if J9(J7) < J5, and J5 otherwise.
Clearly, the operationalization of the NCI model is far more complicated than the
other two models. Unlike the other two models, which have simple, easily intuitively
grasped results, the NCI cannot be exactly encapsulated in a one line formula. This
results from its more nuanced rule: the equilibrium outcome is a product not simply of
the preferences of the justices in the majority, but the distance of the status quo relative to
the proposed alternative for the minority justices. Although this renders it less
immediately useful as an empirical measure, arguably it is its complexity that allows this
model to better capture reality than the other two models and so it is nevertheless a better
measure than the other two measures.
The NCI model nevertheless lends itself to a general, if inexact, characterization.
Essentially, the NCI model captures the negotiations among the majority justices, while
accounting for the danger of defection by the moderate justices. As such, it resembles a
proxy measure proposed and analyzed elsewhere: the mean of the majority coalition (see
Jacobi and Baird, 2006).
Table 2: NCI Model Compared With A Proxy Measure
Status Quo
J5 : (J5 – J4)/2
(J5 – J4)/2 :
(J4 – J3)/2
(J4 – J3)/2 :
(J3 – J2)/2
(J3 – J2)/2 :
(J2 – J1)/2
(J2 – J1)/2 :
(2.J1 – J2)

Proximate
Justice
Predicted
J5

Proxy
Measure
J5

J6

J7

J7

(J7 – J6)/2

J6

(J7 – J6)/2

J6

J6
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(2.J1 – J2) :
(2.J1 – J3)
(2.J1 – J3) :
(2.J1 – J4)
(2.J1 – J4) :
(2.J1 – J5)
(2.J1 – J5) :
(2.J1 – J6)

J6

J6

J6

(J6 – J5)/2

J5

(J6 – J5)/2

J5

J5

As Table 2 shows, on a uniformly distributed ideological spectrum, the difference
between the NCI predictions and the mean of the majority coalition proxy measure is at
most the standardized interval between two justices. Thus for use in empirical work,
while the NCI model cannot be perfectly captured, the theory does nevertheless produce a
plausible measure for empirical use. Despite lacking perfect precision in capturing the
model, given the inherent weaknesses of the traditional measure, I propose that the NCI
measure would be a considerable improvement on the traditional approach.

III. Applying the Models to the Rehnquist Court
This section illustrates the different predictions of the three models by applying
them to the Rehnquist Court. To undertake this analysis, we need a valid estimate of the
justices’ ideological points. Martin and Quinn (2002) developed a measure of ideal
points of Supreme Court justices, which are based on a rank ordering of justices and the
standard is constant, but the justices can change in their designation on this constant
scale. This allows for historical comparisons among justices, as well as examining
whether individual justices’ ideal points change over time, which Martin and Quinn
(2002) find they do. For example, they note that Brennan becomes more liberal over
time, as do Souter and Blackmun (ibid).
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Martin and Quinn take advantage of voting coalitions to make inferences about
the relative placement of justices. A justice who is very often a lone dissenter in
conservative cases will be ranked as more liberal than a colleague who sometimes joins
him or her in 7:2 conservative decisions. If the colleague is rarely the lone dissenter in
conservative cases, then he or she will be designated as a little more conservative. A
moderate justice can change places with another moderate justice by increasing the
number of conservative or liberal votes as compared with that other justice.
Furthermore, this measure provides standardized comparisons over time. Thus,
even though Breyer was never on the Court with Brennan, Breyer’s scores can be
compared to Brennan because Brennan was on the Court with other justices who were on
the Court with Brennan, such as Scalia, Rehnquist and Stevens. Therefore, the rank order
measure simultaneously accounts for change over time and across justices for all years
and therefore renders the ideal points of the justices a standardized comparison of justices
with one another over time. In Table 3, we see that on the Rehnquist Court, O’Connor
and Kennedy are in the middle of the coalition, but their scores show them to be
historically more conservative than the average Supreme Court justice, which probably
accounts for the general sense that the Court is more conservative in the 1990s than at
other times. Not surprisingly, we find Scalia, Rehnquist and Thomas on the conservative
end of the spectrum, Stevens and Ginsburg at the liberal end.
Applying Martin and Quinn’s model to the three models, the general results of the
three models can be specifically assessed. Justice O’Connor, as the median justice, whose
ideological position is on average 0.79, will garner a 9:0 majority at her exact ideal point
and a 5:4 majority for any status quo to the left of her ideal point, up until the midpoint
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between herself and Justice Breyer = -1.135 (since Breyer is positioned at -1.04); and any
status quo to her right, up until the midpoint between herself and Justice Kennedy = 0.87
(as Kennedy is positioned at 0.95). The ranges for in each of the Rehnquist Court justices
are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: The Ideological Range of Influence for Each Justice of the Rehnquist Court
Justice
Stevens
Ginsburg
Souter
Breyer
O’Connor
Kennedy
Rehnquist
Scalia
Thomas

Ideal Point
-3.19
-1.72
-1.23
-1.04
0.79
0.95
1.81
3.70
3.77

Range Left
Range Right
-3.93
-2.46
-2.46
-1.48
-1.48
-1.14
-1.14
-0.13
-0.14
0.87
0.87
1.38
1.38
2.76
2.76
3.74
3.74
3.81

Table 3 presents the equilibrium positions and size of majorities for a continuum
of status quos under the Rehnquist Court. Figure 2 considers these results for the full
spectrum of possible status quos that give rise to different coalitions and outcomes. This
covers double the ideological spectrum of the nine justices, ranging from the distance to
Stevens’ left equal to his distance from O’Connor to his right, through the full judicial
spectrum, and to the point to Thomas’ right that mirrors O’Connor’s position to his left.
Anything further to the extreme left or right produces no change.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Outcomes for the 3 Models for the Rehnquist Court
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As in Table 1, the data in Figure 2 displays the “cutpoint outcomes,” which has
the effect of smoothing out the discontinuity in the collegial model. This is done purely
for simplicity: the discontinuity is still in effect.
Figure 2 is interesting, particularly for its difference from Figure 1 in relation to
the NCI model, and its similarity for the other two models. The UIC model is only
different in the placement of its horizontal line at 0.79, the position of Justice O’Connor.
This illustrates the relative historical conservatism of the Rehnquist court median. Other
than the smoothing, the NCC model in Figure 2 is essentially similar to its incarnation in
Figure 1: the movement of the outcome in lock step with the cumulative expansion of the
coalition renders it fairly unchanging. In contrast, the NCI model is much more sensitive
to changes in the court composition.
When status quos are moderately conservative, under the NCI model the
ideological proximity between Souter and Breyer flattens out the range of equilibrium
outcomes on the majority of the right-hand side of the graph. The proximity between
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Kennedy and O'Connor renders the left-hand side of the graph almost identical to the
median voter model, with the exception of the single peak resulting from the influence of
Rehnquist. The NCI model then, suggests outcomes will cluster at three points: the
median, Souter/Breyer’s ideal points, and some liberal status quos will result in outcomes
that most closely reflect Rehnquist's preferences.
Applied in this way to specific Supreme Court eras, these models raise
empirically testable hypotheses: the UIC model predicts that for the decade that the Court
was stable, we will see outcomes consistently at O’Connor’s preferences. The NCC
model predicts that we will see the full range of the Supreme Court justices’ preferences
reflected. And finally, the NCI model predicts that we will see outcomes clustering at the
three points described above: at the ideal points of O’Connor, Souter and Breyer, and
somewhat less so Rehnquist.

IV. Conclusions
This Article has worked from “first principles” of how justices may balance
competing desires to have case outcomes reflect their ideological preferences with their
assumed preference for a larger coalition, as well as how to balance these preferences
with the constraints of judicial norms, to produce three models of judicial coalition
formation and outcome determination. An impressionistic assessment of the models’
results shows that the unconstrained ideological model and the strongly collegiate model
have flaws: one cannot explain variation in case outcomes, the other has discontinuous
and arguably anti-intuitive results.
It is possible that the unconstrained ideological model is accurate, and the
variation we see is a result of something outside the model, such as the power of the
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opinion writer. But this explanation implicitly relies on certain assumptions: that justices
will sign on to an opinion even when a majority would prefer some other outcome,
because of the power of the opinion writer. This implicitly suggests that no purely
ideological model is correct, as instead of weighing collegiality, under this explanation
justices bow to the norm of opinion writing assignment. In fact, opinion writing
assignment is a norm that anecdotal evidence shows will be disregarded when the
resulting opinion strays too far from the majority’s preferences: according to Justice
Douglas’ account, on another occasion when Chief Justice Burger attempted to subvert
the majority by assigning the case to himself, he eventually had to transform his own
opinion, and the majority will prevailed (Epstein and Knight, 1999).
Other than the discontinuity in the results of the collegiate model, that model also
seems inferior to the constrained ideological model, as we should predict that more
extreme status quos would increase rather than decrease the majority’s power to ensure
that its preferences are expressed in the opinion.
As well as providing three models of judicial coalition formation in case
determination, this Article also proposed three associated measures of the ideological
placement of the Supreme Court’s policy outputs. Here, the constrained ideological
measure is most problematic, simply because it cannot be expressed as simply as the
other two measures. However, parsimony is not everything: the complexity of this
measure is essential to its attractiveness as a descriptive mechanism.
Despite their flaws, all three measures proposed here possess an important
advantage over the traditional measure, the percentage of liberal decisions. All three
models have the advantage that they differentiate very liberal (conservative) outcomes
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from moderately liberal (conservative) outcomes. This is an essential distinction if
empirical studies are to have any precision. We now have three alternative measures of
judicial ideology, which each stem from a rigorous theory of judicial choice in coalition
formation and outcome determination, and each produce testable hypotheses for
assessing the relative merits of the measures.
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